Author: IOSG Legal
Having been deeply involved in the crypto industry for many years, we have made investments in hundreds of projects, and our attitude toward investment terms in the industry has evolved from initial incomprehension to acceptance, and now to today's reflection and questioning:
When a project's structure becomes increasingly complex and its documents increasingly professional, are we really improving safety, or are we merely making risk look more respectable? When an agreement is filled with governance clauses, can these rights actually be enforced, or are they just empty talk?
The systemic risk of Web3 investment often does not lie in the market, but in the insufficient accountability of the architecture itself. The documents are polished and the terminology is complete, but in worst-case scenarios investors cannot find the responsible party, cannot constrain control rights, and cannot pursue remedies. In essence, this is not risk control, but risk packaging.
Three types of recurring structural problems:
One, excessive entity fragmentation: value, control rights, and responsibility are artificially separated. R&D/operations are in one company, token issuing and treasury are in another entity (foundation / SPV), and what investors sign may only relate to one of them. On the surface it looks like risk isolation, but in substance it is "risk without an owner": when something goes wrong, everyone can say "that wasn't me." What investors truly fear has never been decentralization, but de-responsibilization.
Two, governance is symbolized: there are documents but no mechanisms; there are rights but no teeth. In the early days, there were investors' oral promises and gentlemen's agreements (which now look like the adventurous spirit of the Wild West), and later came SAFTE/SAFE/SAFT/SAFE+Token Warrant, yet key links are still missing: substantive consent rights over major matters, the budgeting and audit cadence of treasury expenditures, the replacement rules for multisig signers, and the scope and boundaries of information disclosure. They read like corporate governance, but are executed like a wish list.
Three, remedy paths are structurally weakened: assets move faster than the law, entities change faster than procedures, and cross-border costs are higher than compensation. These are all reasons why rights protection in crypto investment is difficult. For investors, real risk control is not writing longer clauses, but ensuring that in the worst case they can "stop the bleeding," "pursue recourse," and "enforce."
This industry has moved out of the early "dark forest," but sudden project collapses are still common. There are two root causes: first, some founders lack reverence for the spirit of contract; second, the industry lacks structural memory, and investors repeatedly make the same mistakes in structural design.
Through five real case scenarios, this article discusses those structural problems that are usually overlooked but may be fatal in extreme situations, distilling lessons from practice into actionable principles.
Case One: From "Perfect Architecture" to "The Disappearing Defendant"
[Keywords in this case: entity fragmentation, legal entity existence]
A few years ago, we came across a project dedicated to building blockchain gaming infrastructure. The team had a stellar background and a top-tier resume, and its "one-click on-chain" solution directly addressed the core pain points of traditional game publishers. To raise funds and avoid complex global regulation, the project team designed a "perfect" offshore structure that was widely recognized at the time: a parent company incorporated in Delaware, USA, responsible for technical R&D, while an SPV (special purpose vehicle) was set up in crypto-friendly Gibraltar specifically for issuing tokens. Technology and team in the United States, tokens in an offshore SPV—this was the default consensus in investment circles at the time.
Faced with this structure, investors usually took two paths: traditional equity investors put money into the parent company, on the logic that controlling the team means controlling the project. We chose a more "Crypto Native" path: directly signing a Token Purchase Agreement with the Gibraltar SPV, exchanging investment for future token rights. Our judgment was that since tokens were the core asset of this ecosystem's future, directly obtaining token rights was more direct than equity. At the time, this seemed like a quite rational judgment.
After the investment was completed, there was a relatively calm period. The project progressed slowly but steadily, and the team always maintained polite and restrained communication with investors.
However, one day, the Gibraltar SPV, without notifying the U.S. parent company or any investors, suddenly announced a change of CEO and almost simultaneously unilaterally initiated the token issuance. Internal strife became public, market confidence instantly collapsed, and the token price fell immediately upon listing. The "token rights" in our hands turned overnight from potential value into highly volatile digital chips.
Our first reaction at the time was anger, but after calming down, we quickly judged that this looked more like a control struggle within the founding team. The SPV management was clearly trying to break free from the parent company's control, and the institutions that had invested in the parent company's equity would inevitably take legal action, and the project might return to the right track. We chose to wait and see.
Sure enough. The parent company and the equity investors behind it quickly filed lawsuits in the United States and Gibraltar respectively, and won initial victories: they successfully obtained a temporary restraining order from a U.S. court, restoring the parent company's access to key technical infrastructure, and also obtained a freezing order from a Gibraltar court, freezing most of the tokens issued by the SPV. The parent company side was very likely to regain control.
Then, a twist that no one had anticipated appeared.
The Gibraltar court overturned the freezing order. The reason was simple enough to send a chill down one's spine: that U.S. parent company, because it had failed to submit a required compliance document for more than a year, had already been administratively dissolved by the Delaware state government more than a year earlier.
In the legal sense, this company no longer existed.
A company that was already legally "dead" did not have the standing to sue anyone as a plaintiff. It had no legal personality, no capacity as a subject of rights, and no interests that could be protected by a court.
Those institutions that had invested in the parent company's equity were completely out of the game overnight. The legal entity they had invested in had disappeared, and all claims lost their foundation. The investment went to zero.
We who had invested in the SPV's token rights, although our assets were greatly reduced due to internal strife, at least still held tradable tokens. Those equity investors who had been considered "safer" instead completely lost their legal footing.
Rather than relief, what we felt at that moment was more fear after the fact. The most fatal risk in this industry may not be a market crash, a technical vulnerability, or even the character of the founder, but a forgotten compliance document that cost only a few hundred dollars.
Case Conclusion
The continuity of legal due diligence (Legal DD) is crucial. The key to investment decisions lies not only in confirming at the moment of signing the agreement that the company entity is in "Good Standing," but also in establishing a continuous compliance monitoring mechanism that runs through the entire investment cycle. Ensuring that every legal entity in the investment chain is "alive" and compliant is the most basic bottom line of investment management, yet it is often overlooked.
It is necessary to understand the actual control rights of the offshore structure on a look-through basis. When core assets (such as token issuance rights) are placed in an offshore SPV, and the parent company's control over the SPV relies only on a piece of paper, investors must remain highly vigilant. Strong restrictive clauses (Covenants) must be included in the investment agreement, for example: without the consent of the majority of investors, the directors or controllers of the SPV may not be changed; the parent company must maintain its legal existence, otherwise it will trigger a default clause; any major decision (such as Token Launch) must obtain the consent of directors appointed by investors. These clauses must be clearly written into the agreement at the outset of the investment, rather than being patched up after problems arise.
Do not blindly worship the lead investor. Even the top funds in the industry may have blind spots in their due diligence or undisclosed conflicts of interest. Independent, cross-verified background checks (Reference Check) are indispensable. Investors must be responsible for their own funds based on their own independent judgment.
Case Two: The "Evaporation" of Value—Entity Switching and Dilution of Early Investors
[Keywords in this case: entity fragmentation, dilution through entity switching]
There is another type of structural risk that is more hidden and often occurs within a "legal" framework.
In 2021, amid the market boom at the time, we invested in a technology company doing formal verification. The team consisted of experts with top academic backgrounds, had strong technical capabilities, and always showed great respect to investors, with a harmonious cooperative relationship.
However, about two or three years later, we gradually discovered that the founder had begun to build a brand-new token issuance entity, intending to advance the token project under an entity completely separate from the original investment company. What was even more unacceptable was that this new entity neither gave any recognition to the early equity investors nor attempted to include the early investors in the new token rights framework.
From a legal perspective, their maneuver was technically flawless: the new entity was independently registered, and the original investment contract did not directly bind the behavior of this new entity. But from a business logic perspective, this was a systematic deprivation of the value of early investors—early investors used capital and trust to cultivate a team and a set of technology, yet in the end these resources "re-sprouted" in the new entity, while the original equity structure was quietly hollowed out.
We subsequently represented all early investors and engaged in months of arduous negotiations with the founder, arguing vigorously and insisting on securing the rights and interests we deserved. In the end, we obtained for the early investors valuation terms more favorable than those of the new round of investors. But this process nearly exhausted the accumulated relationship with the founder.
This incident made us deeply realize: entity switching can be the most "elegant" way of value plundering.
Case Conclusion
Include an "entity switching protection clause" in the investment agreement. It should explicitly stipulate: if the founder, within a certain number of years after the investment (2-3 years recommended), establishes a new affiliated entity and advances the issuance of core assets (especially Tokens), the early investors should receive corresponding equity shares. This clause should be incorporated into the agreement at the time of the initial investment, rather than locking the barn door after the horse has bolted once problems arise.
Governance rights are more important than valuation. Board seats, the right to be informed of and consent to major structural changes—these are the last line of defense for protecting the interests of early investors. Relationships and trust alone are not enough.
Case Three: When Human Nature Becomes a Variable—Rescue Financing and Broken Promises
[Keywords of this case: remedy paths structurally weakened]
If the first two cases were about the cold博弈 of law and structure, this case is full of the entanglements of human feelings and human nature. Sometimes, what defeats you is not complex clauses, but a face that changes rapidly in the face of interests.
It was during the deepest part of the bear market. A project we had invested in early on had burned through its funds and was on the verge of collapse. The founder spoke earnestly, stating that there was not a penny left on the books and that operations could not be maintained without new capital injection.
Out of a desire to protect our existing investment and a glimmer of hope for the project, we decided to lend a hand and conducted a rescue financing round (Down-round) at a lower valuation. The founder expressed deep gratitude at the time.
After the funds arrived, the project survived. The market soon warmed up, and the sector the project was in became a hot spot. The founder, relying on this "life-saving money," held on until the wind came, and with excellent narrative skills, eventually secured follow-on investment from well-known institutions in a new round and successfully listed on a mainstream exchange.
However, communication with the founder thereafter became extremely difficult. When the investors hoped he would honor his earlier promises, he began a series of evasions—from initially refusing to distribute tokens to investors due to Coinbase listing requirements, to delaying with various excuses such as his own illness and family members' illnesses, and the whole process dragged on for months. Finally, he laid his cards on the table: either accept the same terms as other new investors, or drop it altogether. The kindness of the rescue was cast aside in the face of enormous interests.
Fortunately, our legal and post-investment teams never gave up. Through long-term, patient communication and rights protection, we ultimately recovered the vast majority of the tokens we were entitled to. But this experience revealed a fundamental problem: changes in the interest landscape will systematically change people's behavior. This is not a pessimistic view of human nature, but a variable that should be designed into the contract structure in advance.
Case Conclusion
All business promises, no matter how big or small, must be put into legally binding formal documents. One should not relax the requirements for legal documents just because the other party is humble in demeanor. Business decisions should always be based on the assumption of the worst-case scenario. Rescue financing in a bear market often occurs at the moment of greatest information asymmetry and emotional pressure—precisely the time when it is easiest to relax legal requirements. The more the other party is at their lowest posture and the greater our negotiating advantage, the more we must insist on writing all promises into formal agreements.
Given the scarcity of the spirit of contract, it is necessary to ensure the enforcement of agreements by designing clauses with "teeth." Investment agreements must clearly stipulate liability for breach. For example, if the other party fails to perform specific clauses, it will trigger high liquidated damages, or give investors the right to increase their token holdings at a very low price. The cost of breach must be made significantly higher than the potential gains from betrayal. At the same time, ensure that investors have sufficient negotiating chips, such as board seats, veto power over major matters, or joint control over the company's bank accounts and multi-signature wallets.
Before deciding to rescue, first answer a fundamental question: What is the root cause of this team's funding crisis? Can their values withstand stress testing? Insisting on transparency and compliance is not a lack of trust in the founder, but the most basic protection of the relationship between both parties.
Case Four: Governance Absence—The Cost of Silence
[Keywords of this case: governance symbolized]
There is a type of risk that is neither a loophole in the legal structure nor a subjective betrayal by the founder, but the investors' own absence at a critical moment.
We once invested in a Web3 infrastructure project that was quite promising at the time. Behind the project was a major shareholder with considerable prestige in the industry and substantial assets, which was one of the important reasons we were optimistic about the project in the first place. However, at a certain all-hands meeting, this major shareholder publicly dismissed the CEO, catching the entire team off guard.
We only learned about this afterward from the departed CEO, rather than from an official notice from the project side.
The judgment at the time was: this was merely a normal management adjustment and did not constitute a crisis signal requiring immediate intervention. We did not request an audit, did not request a special shareholders' meeting, did not initiate an evaluation process, and chose silence and wait-and-see.
About six months to a year later, the new management announced: the foundation would be liquidated. In the end, we recovered less than 20% of our initial investment.
In hindsight, that sudden dismissal of the CEO was the clearest early warning signal of the project's decline. When a company undergoes a major abnormal management change, it often means that the core governance structure has already developed deep cracks. At such a time, what investors should do most is immediately demand an independent audit and intervene in governance reconstruction, rather than stand by.
Case Conclusion
List major governance events as mandatory "Trigger Events." Investment agreements should clearly stipulate: major events such as abnormal CEO departure, changes in core shareholders, initiation of litigation or arbitration, etc., will automatically trigger special rights of investors, including requiring an independent financial audit, convening a special shareholders' meeting, and suspending major financial expenditures.
Continuous monitoring, rather than passive waiting. Post-investment management should not stop at routine quarterly updates. Investors need to establish proactive information acquisition channels, including maintaining communication with core project employees (not just the founder). It is recommended that post-investment agreements require the project side to provide independent updates at the CFO/CTO level every quarter, rather than only through the founder as a single channel.
Case Five: The Halo of a Résumé—The Black Hole of Character
[Keywords of this case: governance symbolized, remedy paths structurally weakened]
The investment world often says, "Investing is investing in people." However, we are too easily dazzled by a glittering résumé. Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, top hedge funds... these names seem to carry a halo, making people subconsciously equate "elite background" with "professionalism, self-discipline, and reliability." But the cruel reality is that sometimes the most dangerous ones are precisely these "golden boys." Wall Street training taught them to package narratives, exploit rules, and leverage human hearts. These abilities themselves are neither good nor bad, but once used on the wrong path, their destructive power is far beyond imagination.
We once "fortunately" missed a project. The founder's résumé was impeccable, from Goldman Sachs to JPMorgan, rising all the way to senior executive before leaving to start a business. The project he wanted to build was an "absolutely fair" on-chain entertainment venue. The story was sexy, the team luxurious, and at the time a host of well-known institutions in the circle competed to get in. However, because we had great doubts about the compliance risks of the "casino" sector, and after multiple communications with the founder on compliance paths yielded no results, our risk control department ultimately vetoed the investment.
The twist in the story occurred the day after we made our decision. The project announced the completion of several million dollars in financing. However, within minutes after the funds arrived, the founder began transferring the company's money into his personal wallet. Over the following week, he lost several million dollars of it in another on-chain entertainment app. He promised to build a fair casino, but ended up taking the money to build a casino and becoming a gambler in someone else's venue. This was not a risk management failure; this was naked fraud and embezzlement. In the end, the FBI intervened, the founder was arrested, and he faced years of imprisonment.
Another case we personally experienced was a AAA game masterpiece hailed as the "on-chain Call of Duty." Team members all came from top game studios, but the project burned money at an terrifying rate, as high as two to three million dollars per month, while development progress lagged severely. The company quickly fell into financial crisis, and the team was cut from over a hundred people to only a dozen or so.
Just as the building was about to collapse, we discovered that the project's co-founder and CTO had, over a period of seven months, continuously sold off his own team tokens on the secondary market, cashing out nearly 700,000 dollars in total. Legally speaking, he was selling his own vested shares, which seemed beyond reproach. But from a business ethics perspective, the company was on the brink, a large number of employees had been laid off, and as one of the core leaders, he was frantically cashing out personally. The signal this sent to the market could not be clearer: "The ship is sinking, I'm jumping first."
In these two cases, investors focused excessively on the founder's past halo while neglecting in-depth testing of their current character and behavioral patterns. At the same time, the lack of key controls such as "multi-signature" and "milestone payments" was the direct cause of the loss of control over funds.
Case Conclusion
Character due diligence (Character DD) must be placed first. Resumes can be embellished, stories can be packaged, but a person's character and behavioral patterns are relatively stable. Investment institutions need to establish a more systematic methodology for character due diligence—not only conventional background checks, but potentially deeper interviews and even behavioral stress tests. Of particular concern is: is there a fundamental contradiction between the founder's personal history and the mission of the project he claims to pursue? A person with a gambling record going into the casino business is itself a huge Red Flag.
Fund control is a non-negotiable investment bottom line. For early-stage projects, especially when the founder is solely dominant, all funds absolutely must not be placed in a wallet fully controlled by that individual. Multi-sig wallets should become a mandatory requirement, and the investor or a trusted third party designated by the investor must be one of the signatories. The release of funds should be based on clear, quantifiable Milestones—complete one task, then release the next tranche. These risk control measures, long mature in the traditional VC industry, should be even more strictly enforced in the crypto industry.
Deeply bind the interests of the core team to the long-term development of the project. The unlocking of team tokens should not be tied only to time, but also to the project's milestones—for example, product launch, user numbers reaching a certain scale, protocol revenue reaching a certain level, etc. At the same time, it should be explicitly stipulated in the agreement that during periods when the project is in financial distress or major crisis, core members' token sales will be restricted. This is both a constraint and a stance—demonstrating to the community and all investors the team's determination to stand or fall together with the project.
Conclusion: Return to Common Sense, Survive the Cycle
Having been through so much, we are no longer the hot-blooded "Web3 believers" we once were. We have become more like realists, risk assessors, observers of human nature. We no longer get easily excited by grand narratives, but instead examine every detail like an auditor and test every assumption like an engineer.
When evaluating a project, we now repeatedly ask ourselves:
Do we really understand this founder? Beyond the story he tells himself, have we learned from the side—from his former colleagues, former bosses, or even competitors—what kind of person he is?
Do we really understand the legal structure of this project? Are there hidden "back doors"? If the founder runs away, is the contract in our hands a piece of waste paper or a sharp sword?
After the funds are injected, do we have control over how the funds are used? Or can we only hope for the founder's moral self-discipline?
Are the interests of the founding team truly fully aligned with the interests of us investors? Does their token unlocking mechanism encourage them to build for the long term, or facilitate short-term cash-outs?
When we discover the first signs of a problem, do we have the courage to say no?
Ultimately, a good investment structure is not designed to guard against gentlemen, but to guard against extreme situations. When everyone is honorable, any structure works well; the real test is whether, at moments when interests diverge, the market shifts dramatically, and trust collapses, the contract in your hands can speak for you.
These lessons were bought with real money. We write them down because we believe that the cost of industry progress should not be repeatedly paid by every new generation of entrants.
And precisely for this reason, we have systematically introduced mechanisms such as continuous compliance monitoring, entity-switch protection clauses, and mandatory multi-sig wallet requirements into our investment process. These are not paper improvements, but institutional upgrades precipitated after repeated real costs.






